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LANDELL V. SORRELL: LESSONS LEARNED FROM
VERMONT'S PENDING CHALLENGE TO BUCKLEY
V. VALEO
Nathan Huff'
I. INTRODUCTION
The cost of running for political office in America is rising.' In 1992,
total election spending for the presidential and congressional elections
was 1.8 billion dollars.2 In subsequent years, election spending rose to
$2.2 billion (1996) and then to almost $3 billion (2000). 3 This continual
increase in election spending spans both federal and state elections and
has given rise to widespread public support for government regulation of
campaign spending.
+ J.D. Candidate 2004, Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See generally Kristin Kay Sheils, Landell Bodes Well for Campaign Finance
Reform: A Compelling Case for Limiting Campaign Expenditures, 26 VT. L. REV. 471, 471-
72 (2002). See also Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic
Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1050 (1996) ("Between
1977 and 1992, congressional campaign spending increased by 347%."). In 1976, house
incumbents outspent their challengers by a ratio of 1.5 to 1. Id. In 1992, that ratio
increased to 4 to 1. Id. at 1050-51.
2. Center for Responsive Politics, Campaign Finance Reform, at
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/campaignfinance/index.asp (last visited Sept. 30, 2003).
3. Id. Current evidence indicates that this trend will continue through the 2004
elections where the expenditures will exceed those of the 2000 elections. Id. In the 1999-
2000 election cycle, the Democratic and Republican parties collectively raised $1.2 billion.
Id. This was a thirty-six percent increase from the 1995-1996 election cycle. Id.
4. Anthony Gierzynski, Financing Gubernatorial and State Legislative Elections, in
FINANCING THE 2000 ELECTION 188-89 (David B. Magleby ed., 2002) (noting that
"Political money flows to the places of power within a political system, and as states
become more powerful, more political money flows into state elections"). As a result of
the rising costs of state elections, thirty-five states have implemented some form of
contribution limits. Id. at 189. Since 1979, two-thirds of all states have implemented
major campaign finance reforms. Id.
5. Richard E. Levy, The Constitutional Parameters of Campaign Finance Reform, 8
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 43, 43 (1999) (describing the widespread belief that the influence
of money has corrupted the political process). The author also describes the public's
perception that wealthy individuals can exert undue influence over that process. Id. See
also Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 2 (explaining that the trend has given rise
to several campaign finance reforms). The most popular among these reforms is the
McCain-Feingold Bill (S.27). Id. This bill was sponsored by Senator John McCain (R-
AZ) and Senator Russell Feingold (D-WI). Id. The defining characteristic of this bill was
its ban on soft money. Id. On September 8, 2003, the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, a case challenging the
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Too often, public support for such regulation is based upon the good
intentions of its proponents, rather than the effects of its provisions.6
This focus on the nobility of the intent behind particular legislation,
rather than the actual effects of its provisions, is dangerous Justice
Brandeis expressed this idea in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States
when he said, "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding., 8 The support of the "well-meaning" public for campaign
finance reforms has caused federal and state governments to enact
various reform packages.9
Each of these regulations represents an effort to reconcile regulatory
interests in campaign finance reform with the limits imposed by the First
Amendment.' ° In Buckley v. Valeo, the seminal case on campaign
consitutionality of the bill. Tony Mauro, A Skeptical Rehnquist Takes Center Stage,
LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at 14.
6. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Landell v. Vt. Pub. Interest Research Group, No. 00-9159, dissent at 4 (2d Cir. Aug. 7,
2002) (Winter J., dissenting), available at http://www.nvri.org/library/cases/vermont/
Landell vSorrell/LandellSecondCircuitDissent.pdf, withdrawn 300 F.3d 129 (2d Cir.
2002).
7. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Landell, dissent at 3-4
(Winter J., dissenting).
8. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis argued that
the proponents were diverting attention away from the actual provisions and to the
nobility of their goal, protecting the power of the people. Id. at 478; see also Beauharnais
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 274 (1952) (noting that "[h]istory indicates that urges to do good
have led to the burning of books and even to the burning of 'witches"'); see also Landell,
dissent at 3-4 (Winter J., dissenting). An alternate explanation for the public support of
government regulation in the area of campaign finance is the media's portrayal of
opponents to reform as being self-interested. POLITICAL MONEY: DEREGULATING
AMERICAN POLITICS xiv (Annelise Anderson ed., 2000). Annelise Anderson explained
this phenomenon saying, "Public opinion polls reflect support for added government
control, possibly because both the print and the television media have beaten their drums
for so-called reform and claimed that its failure to pass is merely the result of craven self-
interest." Id. She also noted that the media stands to benefit if campaign finance reforms
are passed. Id. Limiting the amount that candidates are able to spend on their campaigns
increases the power of the media in expressing its political opinions. Id.
9. Levy, supra note 5, at 43. Some scholars have proposed that reform efforts
actually harm the democratic process. Id. For example, Bradley A. Smith, author of
Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, has
noted that during the same thirty-year period public confidence in government decreased
while campaign finance reforms increased. Smith, supra note 1, at 1057-58.
10. Levy, supra note 5, at 43 (discussing how "government regulation of political
campaigns raises concerns that lie at the core of the First Amendment's protection of
freedom of speech"). In 1985, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, which provided candidates the option to
receive public financing for presidential elections conditioned on their acceptance of
expenditure limitations. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480
(1985); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (examining the constitutionality of the
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finance reform, the United States Supreme Court required these
regulations to be narrowly tailored to serve compelling government
interests." Under this standard of review, the Supreme Court has
permitted regulations limiting campaign contributions, but consistently
has invalidated those limiting campaign expenditures. 12  This result
troubles advocates of campaign finance reform because it stifles their
ability to advance the regulatory interest in decreasing the cost of
elections. 3 Despite their best efforts, advocates have been unable to
mount a sufficient challenge to the decision in Buckley. 14
The passage of the 1997 Vermont State Election Campaign Act (Act
64) and the ensuing case challenging its constitutionality represent
advocates' most successful challenge to date.5 Vermont's defense of the
regulation's constitutionality has advanced to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and positioned Vermont on the cutting
edge of the campaign finance reform debate. 6
Vermont's challenge originated in 1997 with the passage of Act 64."
The Act was passed in response to public outcry over the rising cost of
Federal Election Campaign Act as amended in 1974); Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d
459, 462 (D. Vt. 2000) (examining the constitutionality of provisions contained in the 1997
Vermont Campaign Finance Reform Act). The provisions included limitations on
expenditures and contributions. Id.
11. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45. Buckley is the seminal case in the area of campaign
finance reform because it sets out the applicable standard of review for evaluating the
constitutionality of campaign finance regulations. Id. at 15; Levy, supra note 5.
12. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143. The Court held that limitations on campaign
expenditures, independent expenditures, and personal expenditures by candidates were
unconstitutional because they limited the quantity of expression candidates were
permitted to make. Id.; NC-PAC, 470 U.S. at 497.
13. Vermont Public Interest Research Group, Campaign Finance Law Attacked from
all Sides, at www.vpirg.org/campaigns/financereform/cfr-pagelll.html (last visited Sept. 6,
2003); National Voting Rights Institute, Defending Reforms at the State and Local Level, at
www.nvri.org/about/reform.shtml (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).
14. See e.g., Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 264 F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 2001)
(per curiam); Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 919 (6th Cir. 1998). Kruse and
Homans both held that limits on campaign expenditures were unconstitutional. Kruse, 142
F.3d at 919; Homans, 264 F.3d at 1245.
15. 1997 Vermont State Election Campaign Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2801-83
(1997). "In 1997, Vermont declared war against representative and responsive
government under the banner of campaign finance reform." Bruce Fein, Limitations of
Campaign Limits, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at A15 (criticizing Act 64 and the holding
in Landell v. Sorrell); see also Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
16. See Editorial, Campaign Finance Nirvana, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2000) at A10.
17. See generally Tit. 17, §§ 2801-2883; Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 462-65; Landell v.
Vt. Pub. Interest Research Group, No. 00-9159, slip op. at 6 (2d Cir. Aug. 7, 2002),
available at http://www.nvri.org/library/cases/vermont/Landell-v Sorrell/Landell_second_
circuit-opinion.pdf, withdrawn 300 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2002).
20031
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campaigns for state office in Vermont.18  It was intended to control
campaign costs and to provide the United States Supreme Court with an
opportunity to reexamine its decision in Buckley v. Valeo. 9 Secretary of
State Deborah L. Markowitz, in a memorandum to the Vermont State
Legislature, stated that "[s]ome of the law's provisions were adopted
with the express intent of challenging restrictive readings of [the] United
States Supreme Court precedent Buckley v. Valeo . ,20 The provision
that presents the most direct challenge to Buckley imposes mandatory
limits on campaign expenditures."
Act 64 applied these expenditure limits to candidates running in
primary, general, and local elections,22 and placed ceilings on the amount
each candidate could spend based on the office being sought.23 For
example, although candidates for governor were permitted to spend
$300,000 in a two-year election cycle, candidates for state representative
were permitted to spend only $2,000.24
18. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 464; Landell, slip op. at 4.
19. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See also Memorandum from
Deborah L. Markowitz, Vermont Secretary of State to Senate: Elections Division to
Government Operations Committee and House Local Government Committee (Jan. 9,
2001), available at http:llvermont-elections.org/electionsl/200lgamemocf.html (last visited
Nov. 17, 2003); Levy, supra note 5, at 93 (explaining that Buckley "established the basic
constitutional principles governing campaign finance regulation").
20. Memorandum from Deborah L. Markowitz, Vermont Secretary of State to
Senate, supra note 19. In the section of the memorandum entitled "Critical Review of the
Law," the Secretary of State requested "that the legislature consult with the Attorney
General's office before making any changes to the law." Id. This request was intended to
preserve the court case. Id. For example, the secretary advised that, "certain changes to
the law, including repeal, could render the court case moot, frustrating the express
legislative goal of giving the Supreme Court an opportunity to reevaluate its decision in
Buckley v. Valeo." Id.
21. 1997 Vermont State Election Campaign Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2805(a)
(1997). Section 2805a limited the expenditures that candidates for Vermont state offices
could make during a single, two-year election cycle. Id. This section also limited the
contribution amounts that candidates could receive. Id. For example, candidates for state
representative were prohibited from accepting contributions in excess of $200 from a
single source. Id.
22. 1997 Vermont State Election Campaign Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805a(a)
(Supp. 1998).
23. Id. §§ 2805a(a)(1)-(5) (Supp. 1998).
24. Id. §§ 2805a(a)(1) (Supp. 1998). Candidates for lieutenant governor were limited
to $100,000 and candidates for secretary of state, state treasurer, auditor of accounts or
attorney general were limited to $45,000. Id. §§ 2805a(a)(2), (3). Candidates for state
senator were limited to $4,000 with an additional $2,500 allowed per additional seat in
their district. Id. § 2805a(a)(4). Candidates for state representative were permitted to
spend $3,000 if they were campaigning in a two-member district. Id. § 2805a(a)(5). Under
the Act, incumbents were only permitted to spend a percentage of the above figures. Id. §
2805a(c).
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In 1999, a group of plaintiffs consisting of politicians, political action
committees, and private individuals filed suit against the Vermont
Attorney General and fourteen other states' attorneys, attacking the
constitutionality of Act 64's expenditure and contribution limits. 25 At
trial, the district court examined the findings asserted by the Vermont
General Assembly in support of the Act's limits on campaignS 26
expenditures. Notwithstanding these findings, the court still found Act
64's expenditure limits unconstitutional under Buckley v. Valeo.27 All of
the parties involved appealed the district court's decision.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the district court's ruling on Act 64's expenditure limits. 29 The
court of appeals disagreed with the district court's statement that
Buckley created a per se rule against the constitutionality of expenditure
limits.0  The court held that Act 64's expenditure limits satisfied the
First Amendment test set out in Buckley.3
This decision was the first of its kind and was praised by advocates of
campaign finance reform.32 To the dismay of those advocates, the panel
25. Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462-63 (D. Vt. 2000). Other defendants
included the Vermont Public Interest Research Group, the League of Women Voters of
Vermont, and members of the Vermont General Assembly. Landell v. Vt. Pub. Interest
Research Group, No. 00-9159, slip op. at 8-9 (2d Cir. Aug. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.nvri.org/library/cases/vermont/Landell vSorrell/Landellsecond-circuit-opini
on.pdf, withdrawn 300 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2002).
26. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 459. The Vermont General Assembly presented fifteen
specific findings in support of Act 64. Landell, slip op. at 10-12. The Vermont legislature
explained that four factors generally created a situation in which "public officials are
functionally compelled to sell privileged access through the fundraising system." Id. at 25-
26. The General Assembly's first finding was that campaigns in Vermont were becoming
too expensive. Id. Second, the legislature found that this placed an increased burden on
candidates to raise funds. Id. Third, as a result of this burden, candidates were forced to
award privileged access to large contributors. Id. Finally, it found that the first three
factors hindered political debate, candidate interaction, and public confidence and
participation in the electoral process. Id.
27. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 483. The court interpreted Buckley v. Valeo as having
created a per se rule that limitations on campaign expenditures are unconstitutional. Id.
28. Landell, slip op. at 5.
29. Id. at 25. Expenditure Limits In Vermont Elections Upheld Against First
Amendment Challenge, 71 U.S.L.W. 1095 (2002); Election Law: Campaign Finance Law
Passes Constitutional Test, NAT'L L. J. Aug. 19, 2002, at B4.
30. Expenditure Limits in Vermont Elections Upheld Against First Amendment
Challenge, supra note 29; Landell, slip op. at 20 (emphasizing that the Court never
explicitly created a per se rule but instead invalidated the expenditure limitations in
FECA because of the government's failure to establish a sufficiently compelling interest).
31. Landell, slip op. at 25.
32. Editorial, Campaign Finance Nirvana, supra note 16, at 4. The author noted that,
"[s]upporters of strict limits on campaign finance must think they've died and gone to
2003]
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withdrew its decision by order on October 3, 200213 in response to the
plaintiffs' petition for a rehearing en banc. 34 The panel neglected to state
a reason for the withdrawal. 3 However, Brenda Wright, a representative
of the National Voting Rights Institute and the lead attorney
representing the Vermont Public Interest Research Group, speculated
that the panel withdrew its opinion in order to address concerns held by
other judges on the Second Circuit.36 If the panel issues another decision
upholding Vermont's expenditure limits, it will provide the Supreme
Court with an opportunity to reconsider its holding in Buckley.37
This Comment shows that Act 64 and the facts of Landell v. Sorrell are
an inadequate vehicle for challenging Buckley's rejection of campaign
expenditure limits. First, this Comment provides an overview of prior
law pertaining to the constitutionality of limits on campaign
expenditures, emphasizing interpretations of the standard of review in
Buckley v. Valeo and subsequent cases. Second, this Comment shows
that Act 64's expenditure limits do not serve a compelling government
interest. It explains that, thus far, courts have identified only one
government interest that is sufficiently compelling to justify regulations
of campaign finance, and that expenditure limits fail to serve that
interest. Third, this Comment shows that even if the interest asserted by
Vermont in preventing privileged access is compelling, there are
insufficient facts to establish expenditure limits as a valid means of
preventing privileged access. This Comment concludes with suggestions
heaven, now that a court has for the first time upheld limits on how much candidates may
spend even if they aren't receiving public funds." Id.
33. Withdrawn by order dated October 3, 2002, U.S. Court of Appeals (2d Cir.). A
copy of the withdrawn opinion (Landell v. Vt. Pub. Interest Research Group) is available
on file with the author. Anastasoff rejected the argument that unpublished opinions are
not precedent and therefore, parties should not cite them. Anastasoff v. United States,
223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot on reh'g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.
2000); see also Carl Tobias, Anastasoff, Unpublished Opinions, And Federal Appellate
Justice, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1171, 1174-75 (2002).
34. E-mail from Brenda Wright, National Voting Rights Institute, Boston, MA to
Nathan Huff (Nov. 22, 2002 18:08 EST) (on file with author). Cases before the United
States Courts of Appeals are generally heard by a three-member panel of judges. 28
U.S.C.S. 46(c) (2000). However, a majority of the active judges on the circuit can order a
hearing or rehearing en banc. Id. A court sitting en banc consists of all of the circuit
judges in active service and those senior judges who were members of the panel that made
the initial decision. Id. See also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS 11 (6th ed. 2002); Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About the
Second Circuit, at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/COAInfo.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).
35. E-mail from Brenda Wright, supra note 34.
36. Id. Ms. Wright also expressed her surprise at the fact that the panel had not yet
asked the parties to respond to the petition. Id. She indicated that such requests are
general practice when the Courts are seriously considering granting a rehearing. Id.
37. See supra note 14; Campaign Finance Nirvana, supra note 16.
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for states on how to succeed where Vermont has failed in asserting its
challenge to Buckley v. Valeo.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
A. Constitutional Provisions
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the starting
point for any examination of constitutional provisions relevant to state
campaign finance reforms.3s  According to the theory of selective
incorporation, this clause applies the first ten amendments to the states.39
Therefore, states can only violate those amendments through their
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. 4° In the context of
campaign finance reforms, the First Amendment, through its
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment, limits the power of the
states to regulate campaign finance. In Vermont, this power is granted
to its General Assembly by Chapter Two, Sections 6 and 45 of the
42Vermont State Constitution.
The First Amendment protects the basic freedom of expression, which
encompasses both speech and association. One of the major purposes
of this Amendment is to protect political discussion. In Monitor Patriot
38. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 368 (6th ed.
2000).
39. Id.
40. Id. (explaining the doctrine of "selective incorporation," and noting as an
example, "if a state were to abridge the freedom of speech, it would be abridging the First
Amendment as applied to it through the Fourteenth Amendment").
41. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. This Article grants Congress the power to regulate
federal elections. This power exists in tension with, and is subject to, the limitations
created by the First Amendment. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1976). The
Buckley Court noted that, "the critical constitutional questions presented here go not to
the basic power of Congress to legislate in this area, but to whether the specific legislation
that Congress has enacted interferes with First Amendment freedoms or invidiously
discriminates against nonincumbent [sic] candidates and minor parties in contravention of
the Fifth Amendment." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13-14. See also Erznoznik v. Jacksonville 422
U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (explaining that the government can regulate the time, place, and
manner of speech in order to further an important government interest that is unrelated to
the restriction of communication).
42. VT. CONST. Ch. II, §§ 6,45.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
44. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14. The Buckley Court focused on the importance of the
public's ability to make informed decisions regarding candidates for office because elected
officials "shape the course that we follow as a nation." Id. at 15; see also Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). In Roth v. United States, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he
protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas
2003]
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Company v. Roy, the Supreme Court stated, "[I]t can hardly be doubted
that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.,
45
This statement suggests that the protection of the First Amendment
extends beyond the realm of pure speech to conduct such as campaign
46spending.
In the context of political campaigns, this conduct includes spending
money to communicate ideas to the electorate.47  Some argue that the
spending of political money is more like a disposition of property than an
exercise of free speech.48  However, the Supreme Court has made it
abundantly clear that a particular communication's dependence on the
spending of money does not diminish its First Amendment protection.
49
Therefore, campaign expenditures possess the same degree of First
Amendment protection as other forms of expression.
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). Accord N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964) (commenting that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open").
45. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971). In Monitor Patriot, the
Court held that publications that referenced candidates for political office received the
same amount of First Amendment protection as speech made by the actual office holders.
Id. at 271. See also Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). In Garrison, the Court discussed the
essential role of free speech in a democratic society. Id.
46. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 266, 269. In New York Times Co., the Court
awarded First Amendment protection to published statements even though they
constituted paid commercial advertisements. Id.; see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809, 820 (1975). In New York Times Co. and Bigelow, commercial advertising received the
same degree of protection as pure speech.
47. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 (noting that restricting expenditures for political
communication "necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number
of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached").
See also Fein, supra note 15 (emphasizing the necessity of political spending to increase
"candidate speech and corresponding voter education").
48. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398-99 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens argued that money is not speech, but rather property. Id. He
concluded that because limitations on political spending were not limitations on speech,
but rather on property, they did not warrant the same level of constitutional protection.
Id. Justice Stevens noted that "[t]he right to use one's own money to hire gladiators, or to
fund 'speech by proxy,' certainly merits significant constitutional protection. These
property rights, however, are not entitled to the same protection as the right to say what
one pleases." Id. See also Robert F. Bauer, The Demise of Reform: Buckley v. Valeo, the
Courts, and the "Corruption Rationale", 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 11, 11-12 (1998). The
characterization of political spending as speech has been widely criticized. Id. The
primary alternative would be to characterize political spending as conduct. Id. Were it
such, the government would possess extensive authority to regulate it. Id.
49. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 266.
50. See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 272; see also N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 266.
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B. The Federal Election Campaign Act
The Federal Election Campaign Act was the first modern attempt at
comprehensive campaign finance reform.5' Prior to its passage, there
were several regulations of campaign finance of less historical
significance.52 In 1910, Congress passed the Publicity Act, which required
campaign committees for the House of Representatives operating in two
or more states to disclose contributions exceeding $100.13 In 1925, the
51. Buckley v. Valeo, 171 U.S. App. D.C. 172, 182 (1975) (referring to the Federal
Election Campaign Act as "the latest, and by far the most comprehensive, reform
legislation passed by Congress concerning the election of the President, Vice-President
and members of Congress"); Molly Peterson, Note, Reexamining Compelling Interests and
Radical State Campaign Finance Reforms: So Goes the Nation?, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
421, 428 (1998); Sheils, supra note 1, at 478 (noting that the Federal Election Campaign
Act applied only to elections for the offices of President, Senator, and Representative).
The Federal Election Campaign Act has served as the model for recent campaign finance
regulations. Smith, supra note 1, at 1055. The three basic elements of this model are
limits on expenditures, limits on contributions, and public funding. Id.
52. DIANA DWYRE & VICTORIA A. FARRAR-MYERS, LEGISLATIVE LABYRINTH:
CONGRESS AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 4-5 (2001). The authors list several early
campaign finance regulations. Id. In 1907, pursuant to President Theodore Roosevelt's
concern over the role of corporations in elections, Congress passed the Tillman Act. Id. at
4. The Act banned corporations and national banks from contributing to federal
candidates' campaigns. Id. In 1939, Congress passed the Hatch Act, which prohibited
federal employees from "active participation in national politics." Id. at 5. In 1940, that
act was revised, limiting the fundraising and spending abilities of party committees
operating in more than one state. Id. Expenditures were limited to three million dollars
per year; individual contributions were limited to five thousand dollars per year. Id.
Finally, in 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, which was aimed in part at
eliminating contributions by labor unions. Id. In his article discussing the importance of
examining the entire history of campaign finance, Bradley Smith points out that most
examinations of campaign finance start with the ammendment of the Federal Election
Campaign Act in 1974. Smith, supra note 1, at 1051. This, he argues, creates an inaccurate
perception that the influence of money in politics is a modern phenomenon. Id. at 1051-
52.
An examination of the entire history of campaign finance yields a different
conclusion. Id. As Mr. Smith notes, even in the earliest U.S. elections, when candidates
paid for their own campaigns, the same aristocratic white males exerted influence over the
political process. Id. at 1053. The 1828 presidential campaign of Andrew Jackson is seen
as the beginning of expensive, mass campaigns. Id. It was the first campaign that spent
large sums of money on newspaper advertisements, pamphleteering, and rallies. Id. The
passage of the Pendelton Act in 1883, which created the federal civil service, dried up
money from political officeholders, thereby increasing the influence of corporations and
wealthy individuals. Id. Corporations were aware of this new influence. Id. at 1054.
"With the growth of state and federal government powers, including the increased
regulation and subsidization of industry, corporate America recognized the need for
increased political participation. The stated goal was not to buy legislative votes, but to
elect candidates supportive of corporate interests." Id. (footnote omitted).
53. DWYRE & FARRAR-MYERS, supra note 52, at 4.
2003]
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Federal Corrupt Practices Act closed the loophole that allowed non-
election-year contributions to escape disclosure.54
Following its passage in 1971, the Federal Election Campaign Act was
amended several times, the most significant of which was in 1974."5 The
amendments established limits on expenditures by political party
organizations as well as candidates for President, Senator, and
56Representative. As amended, the Federal Election Campaign Act
distinguished the two main types of political spending: campaign
contributions and campaign expenditures, and it placed different
limitations on both types.57 For example, section 608(b)(1) limited
contributions that individuals could make to $25,000 per year, with no
more than $1000 contributed to a single candidate."' Section 608(c)
limited the expenditures of candidates for election to the office of
President to $20 million. 9 In passing the Federal Election Campaign
Act, Congress was aware of the impact of these provisions on First
Amendment freedoms.6° It even included an expedited consideration
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id. The amendments followed the highly publicized Watergate scandal in 1972.
Id. The ensuing investigation and hearing uncovered several abuses of the campaign
finance system, which sparked an increased call for campaign finance reform. Id.
56. Id. at 5-6. Other provisions include: limits on contributions from individuals,
political action committees, and party committees, limits on independent contributions,
disclosure requirements and reporting rules, and an amendment allowing presidential
candidate nominees from major parties to receive public funding. Id. It also established
the Federal Election Commission. Id. The Federal Election Campaign Act was amended
again in 1976 and 1979. Id. at 5. The intent of the disclosure requirements set out in the
Act was to give voters information on the financing of specific campaigns and also to aid in
the enforcement of the other provisions of the Act. Levy, supra note 5, at 45. The
disclosure requirements required political committees (groups that received political
contributions or made political expenditures in excess of $1000 per year) to report the
names of those who contributed in excess of $10 per year, and the names and occupations
of those who contributed $100 or more per year. Id. In Buckley, the Supreme Court
applied intermediate scrutiny to these provisions because they did not restrict free speech.
Id. Sliding scale provisions for public funding of elections apply to presidential candidates.
Id. at 46. Major party candidates receive the most funding, and those representing smaller
parties receive less or none at all. Id. To be eligible for funding, candidates must pledge
to abide by campaign spending limits. Id. The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of these particular expenditure limits because they were voluntary. Id. at
46, 49. The Court also upheld funding of campaigns because it facilitated speech rather
than inhibiting it. Id. at 46.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (a)-(c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
58. Id. § 608(b)(1), (3).
59. Id. § 608(c)(1)(B). This provision also limited the expenditures of candidates for
nomination to the office of President to ten million dollars. Id. § 608(c)(1)(A).
Candidates for election to the office of Senator were limited to the greater of twelve cents
multiplied by the total voting age population of the state or $150,000. Id. § 608(c)(1)(A).
60. Peterson, supra note 51, at 428.
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provision, which allowed an almost immediate consolidated challenge to
the Act.6
C. Buckley v. Valeo: Four Lasting Effects
The challenge to the Federal Election Campaign Act came in the 1976
Supreme Court case, Buckley v. Valeo.62 The case arose during a period
when the rising cost of election campaigns caused most Americans to
question the integrity of their democratic system.63 The Supreme Court
examined the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 as amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1974. 64 The decision affected the law surrounding campaign finance
reform in four significant ways. First, the Court drew a distinction
between the treatment of contribution and expenditure limits. 6 Second,
it declared the applicable standard of review for government regulations
of campaign finance.6  Third, it rejected three broad government
interests in limiting campaign expenditures.6 ' And finally, the Court
identified the "preventi[on] of corruption or the appearance of
corruption" as the only sufficiently compelling government interest in
campaign finance regulation.68 The Buckley Court's analysis has shaped
61. Id.
62. Id.; see also Bauer, supra note 48, at 11 (noting that since its decision, Buckley v.
Valeo has been highly controversial).
63. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 838-39 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Center for Political
Studies conducted a survey asking Americans: "Would you say the government is pretty
much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit
of all the people?" Id. at 839. In 1970, 49.6 percent responded a "few big interests." Id.
In 1974, the percentage answering the same way jumped to 69.9 percent. Id. Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20 (1976). In 1974, seventeen of the sixty-five major senatorial
candidates spent more than the combined fundraising amounts allowed by the Federal
Election Campaign Act for the primary and general elections. Id. at 20 n.21.
64. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6.
65. Id. at 20-21 (noting that "[bly contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for
political expression, a limit upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute
to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the
contributor's ability to engage in free communication"); Bauer, supra note 48, at 12.
66. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45 (holding that "exacting scrutiny" was applicable to
regulations that limit the right of political expression); Levy, supra note 5, at 44. See also
Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 532 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying the Buckley standard to
state election laws).
67. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 53, 54, 57. The governmental interests rejected by the Court
were the prevention of corruption, equalizing the resources available to candidates, and
reducing the cost of political campaigns. Id.
68. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985)
(explaining its holding in Buckley with regard to corruption). The Court stated that it
"held in Buckley and reaffirmed in Citizens Against Rent Control that preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling
government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances." Id. at 497. See
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campaign finance law over the last twenty-six years, and is still followed
69in cases involving campaign finance reform.
1. Expenditures Distinguished from Contributions
In analyzing the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign
Act, the Buckley Court made a deliberate distinction between those
provisions limiting expenditures and those limiting contributions. 70 The
Court determined that limitations on expenditures required a higher
level of judicial scrutiny because they decreased the quantity of
permissible political communication. It noted that nearly every means
of communicating through mass media required the spending of money.72
It also noted that the electorate largely depended on the media as a
source of information about candidates.73 Therefore, limitations on
expenditures were equivalent to limitations on the quantity of speech
permitted.74 The Court did not apply this heightened level of scrutiny to
limits on contributions, because contributions had less communicative
also Bobby R. Burchfield, Enemies of the First Amendment, in POLITICAL MONEY:
DEREGULATING AMERICAN POLITICS 241,242 (2000).
69. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); Kruse v. City of
Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 909 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Landell v. Vt. Pub. Interest Research
Group, No. 00-9159, slip op. at 19 (2d Cir. Aug. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.nvri.org/library/cases/vermont/Landell vSorrell/Landell-second-circuit-opini
on.pdf, withdrawn 300 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that "Buckley v. Valeo remains the
seminal case governing the constitutional review of campaign finance reform efforts,
including expenditure limitations").
70. NC-PAC, 470 U.S. at 491; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21. See also Kruse, 142 F.3d at
911-12.
71. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-20. For example, on January 1, 1975, a full page
advertisement in the daily edition of most major metropolitan newspapers cost $6971,
seven times the amount allowed under § 608(e)(1). Id. at 20 n.20. See also Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 440 (2001).
72. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 (explaining that "[t]he distribution of the humblest
handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs").
73. Id. (referring to television, radio, and other mass media as "indispensable
instruments of effective political speech"). Furthermore, the Court noted the importance
of a well-informed electorate to ensuring the proper function of a democracy. Id. at 52-53.
See also Fein, supra note 15 (commenting that "[tihe political illiteracy of the average
citizen is appalling. What is desperately needed to revitalize our democracy and system of
representative government is more, not less, candidate speech and corresponding voter
education."). In Whitney v. California, the Supreme Court stated that "Public discussion is
a political duty." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927), overruled by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The Court in Buckley commented that this
holding "applies with special force to candidates for public office." Buckley, 424 U.S. at
53. See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (discussing the importance of
the public's right to speak freely about government affairs).
74. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. The Court analogized being free to engage in unlimited
political speech under spending limitations to "being free to drive an automobile as far
and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline." Id. at 17-18.
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value than expenditures. It also stated that contributions expressed
general support for a candidate through a "symbolic act," without
communicating the underlying reasons for that support.76
In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal
Election Commission, the Supreme Court added: "[T]he symbolic
communicative value of a contribution bears little relation to its size.,
77
This statement corresponds with the majority in Buckley, which also
recognized that, at most, contributions indicated the strength of an
individual's support for a candidate.78 Because the size of contributions is
of little significance, placing limits on them has a minimal impact on the
right to free speech.79  Therefore, limitations on contributions receive
something less than strict judicial scrutiny.8°
2. Standard of Review
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court applied a First Amendment
analysis to the Federal Election Campaign Act." The Court utilized a
basic means-ends test,"' requiring a factual showing that regulations of
campaign finance (the means) be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest (the ends). 83 Applying this heightened standard to
75. Id. at 20-21 (explaining that unlike limitations on expenditures, limitations on
contributions "entail[] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage
in free communication").
76. Id. at 21. The Court explained that an increase in the size of a contribution does
not alter the general communication of support, because the communication rests solely
on the symbolic act of making the contribution. Id. The Court noted that "[wihile
contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to
present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate
involves speech by someone other than the contributor." Id.
77. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604,
615 (1996). The Court also noted that despite contribution limits, a contributor is still free
to engage in other types of political expression, such as volunteering. Id.
78. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 (noting that, "[a]t most, the size of the contribution
provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the
candidate"). The Court explained that contribution limits forced candidates to raise funds
from an increased number of individuals and forced contributors to spend more of their
money on direct political expression. Id. at 21-22.
79. Id. at 21.
80. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't, 528 U.S. 377, 387 (2000) (noting that "ever since
Buckley ... contribution limits would more readily clear the hurdles before them"). See
also Colo. Republican, 518 U.S. at 615; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-22.
81. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19, 44-45, 52-54.
82. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819). Chief Justice Marshall stated,
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Id.
83. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990) (interpreting
Buckley as requiring government regulations of political speech to be narrowly tailored to
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the Federal Election Campaign Act, the Buckley Court held that the
Act's limitations on contributions were constitutional but its limitations
on expenditures were not.84 The Court determined that the limits on
contributions served the compelling government interest in eliminating
actual or apparent corruption.8 ' The Court found no indication that the
expenditure limits achieved this interest.
86
The standard of review set out in Buckley v. Valeo continues to be the
prevailing rule in testing the constitutionality of campaign finance
reforms.87 For example, in the recent case of Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, the Supreme Court articulated the Buckley standard
of review in terms of a three-part test. 8 First, the Court asked whether
the provision in question was entitled to full First Amendment
protection.8 9  Second, it inquired whether the provision served a
sufficiently compelling government interest.90 Third, the Court examined
whether the provision was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.9'
3. Three Government Interests Explicitly Rejected by Buckley v. Valeo
The Buckley Court was the first to discuss what constitutes a
sufficiently compelling government interest in limiting campaign
expenditures.92 In its analysis of the Federal Election Campaign Act, the
Court deemed three general government interests insufficient to justifyS 93
limitations on expenditures. First, the interest in "the prevention of
actual and apparent corruption of the political process" and "alleviating
serve a compelling government interest). See also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45; Levy, supra
note 5, at 44. The Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo classified campaign finance reforms
as content-based restrictions on speech. 424 U.S. at 44-45. As such, the Court required
that they be narrowly tailored to serve a sufficiently compelling government interest. Id.
84. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45 (explaining that "the Act's expenditure limitations
impose far greater restraints on the freedom of speech and association than do its
contribution limitations").
85. Id. at 26.
86. Id. at 45. The Court found no evidence that the expenditures prohibited by the
Act resulted in corruption. Id. at 45-46.
87. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000); Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985); Suster v.
Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 532 (6th Cir. 1998); Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 911
(6th Cir. 1998).
88. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 387-88.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. The Court articulated the requirement that a provision be narrowly tailored
by mandating that the provision be "closely drawn" to serve the government interest. Id.
92. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976); NC-PAC, 470 U.S. at 496-97; Suster,
149 F.3d at 532; Kruse, 142 F.3d at 911.
93. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 53-57.
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the corrupting influence of large contributions" were invalidated because
the Act's contribution limits already served those interests.9 4 The Court
rejected the second interest, leveling the election playing field by
equalizing the financial resources available to candidates, for two
reasons.95 First, the Court explained that the level of financial resources
available to candidates will often vary depending on the candidate's level
of support.96 Second, any effort to equalize campaign expenditures might
actually handicap an unknown candidate who needs to bolster his or her
name recognition.97
Finally, the Buckley Court invalidated the interest in reducing the cost
of elections.9 This interest was rejected because the government lacked
the power under the First Amendment to deem spending to promote
one's political views wasteful. 99 The Court also noted: "In the free
society ordained by our Constitution it is not the government, but the
people.., who must retain control over the quantity and range of debate
on public issues in a political campaign."' ° This language confirms the
Court's deference to the people in matters involving political speech.
4. The Government Interest in Preventing Corruption
The Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted Buckley v. Valeo as
identifying the only government interest sufficient to justify campaign
finance reforms: the prevention of actual or apparent corruption of the
political process. 1' For example, in Federal Election Commission v.
94. Id. at 53, 55. The Court was referring to the provisions contained in section
608(a). Id. at 53.
95. Id. at 56. The Court also pointed out the harm that limitations could cause to a
candidate who lacked the same level of name recognition as his opponent. Id. at 57.
Mainly, the candidate would be limited in his ability to spend in order to compensate for
his lack of name recognition. Id.
96. Id. at 67.
97. Id. at 56-57. Accord NAACP v. Jones, 131 F.3d 1317, 1325 (9th Cir. 1997)
("Neither candidates nor voters have a right to judicial elections that are financially viable
for all candidates seeking election.").
98. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496-97
(1985); Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290, 296-97 (1981); see also Burchfield, supra note 68, at 242. Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000); United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364
U.S. 520, 562 (1961) (commenting that democracy works "only if the people have faith in
those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when high officials and their
appointees engage in activities which arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption").
The Supreme Court explained the importance of preventing the appearance of corruption
in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: "Leave the perception of impropriety
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National Conservative Political Action Committee, a majority of the
Supreme Court struck down provisions of the Federal Election
Campaign Act limiting expenditures because they failed to prevent
corruption.i
Several courts have interpreted Buckley's identification of this single
interest as having implicitly created a per se rule that any limit on
campaign expenditures is unconstitutional. 0 3 This interpretation is also
derived from Buckley's holding that no correlation exists between
expenditures and corruption, and, therefore, expenditure limits cannot
serve the interest in preventing corruption.4 Since Buckley, courts have
been unable to find a factual showing sufficient to establish this
correlation.0 5
III. LANDELL V. SORRELL: VERMONT'S CHALLENGE TO BUCKLEY V.
VALEO
Landell v. Sorrell arose in response to the passage of the 1997 Vermont
Campaign Finance Reform Act (Act 64).1°6 The Act was passed
following the governor's inaugural address, which focused on problems
resulting from the increasing cost of elections for political office in
Vermont.0 7 Act 64 included limitations on political expenditures similar
unanswered, and the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize
the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance." 528 U.S. at 390.
102. NC-PAC, 470 U.S. at 496-97; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 53 (holding that the
government interest in preventing actual or apparent corruption was insufficient to justify
limitations on candidates' expenditure of their personal funds). In Citizens Against Rent
Control, the Supreme Court articulated an even broader interpretation when it stated:
"Buckley identified a single narrow exception to the rule that limits on political activity
were contrary to the First Amendment. The exception relates to the perception of undue
influence of large contributors to a candidate." 454 U.S. at 296-97.
103. See Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1998). See also
Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 264 F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 2001). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's holding that
Buckley did not create such a rule. Id. The court held unconstitutional provisions
contained in the Albuquerque, New Mexico City Charter that limited expenditures by
candidates. Id. at 1244-45. In doing so, it cited the Buckley Court's rejection of three
proposed government interests in limiting expenditures: deterring corruption, equalizing
the financial resources of candidates, and restraining the cost of campaigns. Id. at 1243-44.
See also Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604,
627 (1996) (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that "[t]he central holding in Buckley v. Valeo is that spending
money on one's own speech must be permitted").
104. Colo. Republican, 470 U.S. at 496-97.
105. Id.; Homans, 264 F.3d at 1244.
106. 1997 Vermont Campaign Finance Reform Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2801-
2883 (1982).
107. Landell v. Vt. Pub. Interest Research Group, No. 00-9159, slip op. at 4 (2d Cir.
Aug. 7, 2002), available at http://www.nvri.org/library/cases/vermont/Landell-vSorrelU
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to those held unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo.108 One such provision,
section 2805a, limited candidates' total campaign expenditures during a
two-year election cycle according to the office being sought.1°9 This
provision constituted a direct assault on Buckley's treatment of
expenditure limits.10
Landell v. Sorrell consolidated three separate challenges to the
constitutionality of several provisions of Act 64.11 The plaintiffs sought
declaratory and injunctive relief under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.2 During a
ten-day bench trial, the district court examined the evidence presented
by the General Assembly in support of Act 64."3 This evidence consisted
of fifteen specific findings of fact, including: candidates give preferred
access to wealthy contributors; the increasing cost of elections forces
candidates to depend on large contributions; and large campaign
contributions and expenditures decrease public confidence1
Landellsecond circuit-opinion.pdf, withdrawn 300 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2002). During his
1997 inaugural address, Vermont Governor Howard Dean said, "As I've said before,
money does buy access and we're kidding ourselves and Vermonters if we deny it. Let us
do away with the current system." Id.; see also Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465
(D. Vt. 2000). The General Assembly also considered modern campaign finance scandals
in Vermont prior to the passage of Act 64. Id. One such scandal involved allegations that
Republican members of the legislature weakened an anti-smoking bill in response to a
$25,450 donation made by Philip Morris to the Republican Party. Id. at 466.
108. Landell, slip op. at 6-7; Fein, supra note 15 (stating that "[i]n 1997, Vermont
declared war against representative and responsive government under the banner of
campaign finance reform .... Urgently needed and constitutionally coveted political
speech was the law's first casualty.").
109. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805(a) (1982 & Supp. 1998); Landell, slip op. at 6-7.
110. See Memorandum from Deborah L. Markowitz, supra note 19 and accompanying
text.
111. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 463; Landell, slip op. at 4-5.
112. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 459, 462. The plaintiffs argued that certain provisions
of Act 64 violated their rights of free speech and association. Id.
113. Landell, slip op. at 9; See generally Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
114. Landell, slip op. at 10-12. Other relevant findings included: (1) Due to the rising
cost of elections in Vermont, many Vermonters are prohibited from running for office. Id.
at 10. (2) The increase in campaign costs has caused a decrease in the "[r]obust debate of
issues, candidate interaction ... and public involvement and confidence in the electoral
process." Id. at 11. (3) The contribution limits contained in Act 64 allow candidates to
raise sufficient funds to campaign. Id. (4) "Citizen interest, participation and confidence
in the electoral process is lessened by excessively long and expensive campaigns." Id. (5)
Incumbents have a significant advantage over challengers in the electoral process and
should therefore be limited in the amount of expenditures they may make. Id. at 12.
Another justification Vermont used to support expenditure limits was the fact that
campaigns were becoming too expensive. Fein, supra note 15. Editorialist Bruce Fein
responded by stating, "[A] campaign is 'too expensive' only in the eye of the beholder. No
number can be plucked from the heavens as the benchmark for determining 'too much'
candidate speech." Id.
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After examining these findings, the district court found that Vermont
had demonstrated several compelling justifications for Act 64's
expenditure limitations. 15  These justifications included freeing
incumbents from the burden of excessive fundraising, preserving faith in
the democratic process, protecting the access of those who cannot afford
to provide large donations, and decreasing the importance of thirty-
second television ads."6 Despite finding these interests compelling, the
district court held the expenditure limits to be unconstitutional.1 7 The
court interpreted Buckley as having created a per se rule that
expenditure limits were unconstitutional" 8  As a result, the court
enjoined Vermont from enforcing the campaign expenditure
limitations." 9
The parties appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit to determine whether Act 64's challenged provisions
violated the First Amendment.2 In an opinion that was later withdrawn,
121the court held that Act 64's expenditure limits were constitutional.
First, it rejected the district court's finding that Buckley v. Valeo created
a per se rule that expenditure limitations were unconstitutional.' 22 It
pointed out that Buckley was decided on a narrow factual basis and that
the Court never specifically stated that all expenditure limits were
unconstitutional. 23  Further, the Second Circuit stated that the
expenditure limits in Buckley were invalid because the government failed
to assert a compelling government interest.124  The court stated that
"[a]fter Buckley, there remains the possibility that a legislature could
identify a sufficiently strong interest, and develop a supporting record,
115. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 478.
116. Landell, slip op. at 12.
117. Id.
118. Id. Having found that Buckley v. Valeo created a per se rule against campaign
expenditure limitations, the court refused to violate the doctrine of stare decisis. Id. See
also Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 483.
119. Landell, slip op. at 4.
120. Id. at 5. In its discussion, the court noted that in First Amendment cases, the
breadth of review is expanded so that the appellate court must independently examine the
entire record. Id. at 17 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
499 (1984)); supra note 29 and accompanying text.
121. Landell, slip op. at 5-6.
122. Landell, slip op. at 18; Expenditure Limits in Vermont Elections Upheld Against
First Amendment Challenge, supra note 29.
123. Landell, slip op. at 19-20, 21-22.
124. Id. at 19-20.
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such that some expenditure limits could survive constitutional review."''
The court found that Vermont had identified such an interest.
12 1
The Second Circuit held the government interest in preventing
privileged access by wealthy contributors at the expense of those who
could not afford to make large campaign contributions to be sufficiently
compelling. 2 1 More specifically, it held that Vermont's General
Assembly demonstrated that unlimited campaign expenditures in
Vermont led to a situation where "elected officials [are] forced to
provide privileged access to contributors in exchange for campaign
money."'1'  The court found that preventing this favoritism was a
compelling interest because it protected the accessibility and
accountability essential to the democratic process.
129
IV. FATAL FLAWS IN VERMONT'S CHALLENGE TO BUCKLEY V. VA LEO
In Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications
Commission, Justice Kennedy stated: "When the Government defends a
regulation on speech as a means to redress past harms or prevent
anticipated harms, it must do more than simply 'posit the existence of the
disease sought to be cured.""'3  In the case of campaign finance reform,
the government must show that the regulations in question are "narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest."'31  In Landell v. Sorrell,
Vermont failed to make this showing.
125. Id. at 21-22. The court focused on language from Buckley stating that none of
the governmental interests proposed were sufficient to justify the expenditure limits. Id.
at 19-22.
126. Id. at 25.
127. Id.
128. Id. This exchange of money for access fits the definition of a financial quid pro
quo. Id. at 27.
129. Id. at 25-26. Neither individuals nor organizations should have greater access
and, therefore, greater influence over government officials simply because they can afford
to make large contributions. Id. at 27. The court noted several factors underlying this
compelling interest. Id. at 25-26. First, campaigns were becoming too expensive, thereby
forcing candidates to spend too much time fundraising. Id. at 25. Candidates therefore
needed to attract and favor larger contributors over lesser contributors, resulting in drastic
increases in the overall campaign expenditures. Id. The court also noted that the limited
number of contributions in Vermont compounded the effects of these factors. Id. at 25-26.
Thus, the court found that the expenditure limitations reduced corruption of the process
by relieving the "financial pressures [of] spiraling campaign costs . I..." d. at 26.
130. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 664
(1994).
131. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990) (citing Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976)); David Schultz, Proving Political Corruption:
Documenting the Evidence Required to Sustain Campaign Finance Reform Laws, 18 REV.
LITIG. 85, 132 (1999) (arguing that Buckley and its progeny have developed a third
requirement for sustaining a campaign finance regulation). Schultz asserts that in addition
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A. Campaign Expenditure Limits Still Do Not Serve a Compelling
Government Interest
Buckley and its progeny make clear that the only compelling interest
sufficient to justify campaign finance regulations is the prevention of
actual or apparent corruption.13  Expenditure ceilings, such as those
contained in Act 64, fail to serve this interest. 4 The primary reason for
this failure is the lack of a correlation between expenditures and
corruption.' Even if such a correlation were shown to exist, Act 64's
expenditure limits are not narrowly tailored to serve this interest. 1
6
1. Campaign Expenditures Do Not Lead to Corruption
In Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political
Action Committee, the Supreme Court defined corruption as a
"subversion of the political process." '  The Court explained that the
ultimate example of corruption in the political context is payment of
money for political favors. 11 This financial quid pro quo results from
contributions to candidates, not expenditures by candidates. 139  As a
result, the Court found no factual indications that campaign expenditures
to being narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, campaign finance
regulations also must be supported by an "empirical fact-finding" indicating a need for the
specific regulation. Id. He cites Kruse v. City of Cincinnati as an example of a decision
invalidating a campaign finance regulation because of its failure to satisfy this additional
requirement. Id. at 106-07. The court in Landell addressed this additional requirement
when it said "[a]fter Buckley, there remains the possibility that a legislature could identify
a sufficiently strong interest, and develop a supporting record, such that some expenditure
limits could survive constitutional review." Landell, slip op. at 21-22 (emphasis added).
132. Landell, dissent at 60 (Winter J., dissenting) (asserting that "[t]he record in
justifying Act 64's massive regulation of political speech is not strong; in fact, it is pitifully
weak"). The Vermont General Assembly considered campaign finance summaries for
statewide races during the period from 1978-1996. Landell, slip op. at 9. The dissent
pointed out that the average candidate for office in Vermont historically spent less than
the ceilings enacted in Act 64. Landell, dissent at 60. These findings were insufficient to
establish the compelling nature of the interest in preventing privileged access. Id.
133. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985)
(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)) The court also referred to the interest in
decreasing corruption identified in Buckley as an exception to a general rule that limits on
political activity were unconstitutional. Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 532 (6th Cir.
1998); Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 913 (6th Cir. 1998).
134. See NC-PAC, 470 U.S. at 496-97; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55 (holding that the
Federal Election Campaign Act's limitations on campaign expenditures did not serve the
government interest in alleviating actual or apparent corruption).
135. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55-56.
136. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604,
615-19 (1996).
137. NC-PAC, 470 U.S. at 497.
138. Id.
139. See id.; see also Colo. Republican, 518 U.S. at 615-19.
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lead to corruption, and therefore invalidated the campaign expenditure
limits at issue for failure to serve a compelling government interest. 140
Similar to Federal Election Commission, the record in Landell v.
Sorrell did not demonstrate the connection between expenditures and
corruption.1 4 1 In his dissenting opinion from Landell v. Vermont Public
Interest Research Group, Judge Winter referred to the factual record
established in Landell v. Sorrell as "pitifully weak., 142 The district court
cited facts from the General Assembly's consideration of Act 64, which
involved over sixty-five hearings and 145 witnesses. 14 However, most of
this testimony consisted of one-sided personal opinions that failed to
create a sufficient basis for establishing a connection between campaign
expenditures and corruption. The court also considered allegations of
specific instances of corrupt campaign fundraising practices. Although
very serious, Judge Winter stated that the allegations "added[] nothing to
what was considered and rejected in Buckley.',
146
140. NC-PAC, 470 U.S. at 496-97. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit followed
this view in Kruse v. City of Cincinnati when it said, "[T]he spending of money legally
raised by candidates themselves poses no risk of quid pro quo corruption and campaign
spending limits cannot be justified by the anti-corruption rationale." Kruse v. City of
Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1998). This decision provides support for the
view that campaign spending limits are not narrowly tailored to serve the interest in
alleviating actual or apparent corruption because expenditures do not pose the same
threat of corruption as contributions. Id. The Kruse court used this rationale to invalidate
limits on campaign expenditures contained in a Cincinnati city ordinance. Id. at 909. It
found the interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption insufficient
to justify limitations on campaign expenditures. Id. at 915. It interpreted Buckley v. Valeo
to stand for the proposition that contribution limits and disclosure requirements were the
only constitutional means of serving the interest in preventing corruption. Id.
141. See NC-PAC, 470 U.S. at 496-97. The Court found that expenditures, especially
those uncoordinated with a candidate's campaign, had no tendency to produce corruption
or the appearance of corruption. Id.
142. Landell v. Vt. Pub. Interest Research Group, No. 00-9159, dissent at 60 (2d Cir.
Aug. 7, 2002) (Winter J., dissenting), available at http://www.nvri.org/library/
cases/vermont/Landell vSorrell/LandellSecondCircuitDissent.pdf, withdrawn 300 F.3d
129 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466-69 (D. Vt. 2000)
(examining the history and purpose of Act 64). Sorrell took place at a time when Vermont
ranked 49th in the nation in campaign spending. Id.
143. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
144. Id. at 466-67. "Much of the testimony heard was anecdote and personal opinion."
Id. "[Flew witnesses, if any, testified against the bill." Id. Senator Peter Shumlin's
statements to the Senate Committee on Government Operations provide an example of
the type of testimony elicited during the hearings. Id. at 467. He testified that, "the time
he spent raising funds prior to the 1996 elections 'was one of the most distasteful things
that I've had to do in public service."' Id.
145. Id. at 465-66 (citing instances when government decisions favored large
contributors).
146. Landell, dissent at 59 (Winter J., dissenting). In the two decades leading up to
Buckley, there was a three hundred percent increase in campaign expenditures and a
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2. Act 64's Ceilings on Campaign Expenditures Are Not Narrowly
Tailored to Serve the Anti-Corruption Interest
To survive the Buckley analysis, a regulation of campaign finance must
accomplish more than serving the interest in preventing actual or• 147
apparent corruption. A regulation must also be narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.'48 To satisfy this requirement, a regulation on speech
must use the least restrictive means possible to serve the government
interest asserted.
49
Buckley held that limits on campaign contributions and disclosure
requirements operated as the least restrictive means of serving the
government's interest in preventing actual or apparent corruption.50 The
Court explained that the presence of these provisions made limits on
campaign expenditures unnecessary.!" It found no indication that the
Federal Election Campaign Act's contribution limits and disclosure
requirements were insufficient to serve the interest in preventing actual
or apparent corruption.
1
1
2
major campaign fundraising scandal involving the President. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
20 (1976).
147. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45.
148. Id. See also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496-
97 (1985); accord Landell, slip op. at 25; Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 913 (6th
Cir. 1998).
149. See NOWAK, supra note 38, at 1072. "Even if the legislative purpose is legitimate,
and one of substantial governmental interest, the government cannot pursue it by means
that broadly stifle personal liberties if the end can be more narrowly achieved." Id. See
also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (invalidating a statute requiring teachers
to file affidavits listing organizations they belonged to during the previous five years
because it was not narrowly tailored, but rather "completely unlimited").
150. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55-56. The Court was not persuaded by the argument that
expenditure limitations were necessary to prevent circumvention of the contribution
limits. Id. The Court said that it lacked any indication that the criminal penalties for
violating the contribution ceilings were insufficient to adequately serve this interest. Id. at
56.
151. Id. at 55. Section 608(b) of the Federal Election Campaign Act prohibited
individuals from contributing more than $25,000 per year or $1000 to any single candidate.
Id. at 58; Kruse, 142 F.3d at 915. "However, NC-PAC and Colorado Republican make
eminently clear that spending limits on PACs and political parties are unconstitutional not
simply because of the presence of contribution limits but because they are not narrowly
tailored to serve this interest." Id.
152. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55-56; see also Kruse, 142 F.3d at 915-16. Since Buckley v.
Valeo, courts have been faced with the argument that rapid growth of election spending
has rendered contribution limits and disclosure requirements insufficient to support the
interest in preventing corruption. Kruse, 142 F.3d at 915. "As recent events in this nation
have shown, contribution limits, alone, will not protect the integrity of the electoral
process." Id. (citing Dawn to Dark/Chasing the Dollars: One Day on the [Federal]
Fundraising Trail, BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 1997, at Al). In Kruse v. City of Cincinnati,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined this argument in light
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In Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, the Sixth Circuit rejected the
expenditure limits at issue because they were not narrowly tailored to
prevent apparent or actual corruption.53 The court stated that campaign
expenditures did not pose the same threat of corruption as campaign
contributions, 14 and that limits on expenditures more directly impacted
the freedom of speech than limits on contributions."' Therefore, not
only were expenditure limits less effective than contribution limits as a
means of preventing corruption, they also placed a greater burden on the1156
freedom of speech•. As a result, the court held that expenditure limits
were not the least restrictive means available to eliminate actual and
apparent corruption.
157
When accompanied by contribution limits, expenditure limits are not
narrowly tailored because they fail the least restrictive means test.'
However, the facts surrounding Landell v. Sorrell indicate that even
absent contribution limits, Act 64's expenditure limits would fail to
satisfy the narrowly tailored requirement."' For example, candidates for
state office in Vermont have historically spent less than the mandatory
ceilings imposed by Act 64.'6 In fact, during the three election cycles
preceding Landell v. Sorrell, the average House and Senate candidates
spent less than their respective maximum amounts. As a result, Act
of modern campaign finance data. See Kruse, 142 F.3d at 915. The City argued that the
twenty years following Buckley demonstrated that contribution limits were ineffective as a
means of preventing corruption. Id. It based this argument primarily on newspaper
articles describing recent abuses in federal elections. Id. The Sixth Circuit nevertheless
rejected the argument that contribution limits and disclosure requirements were no longer
effective to prevent corruption. Id. "We are not unaware of the excesses of the federal
campaign system. However, to the extent the City is relying on its interest in preventing
real and perceived quid pro quo corruption, the Supreme Court's decisions in Buckley,
NC-PAC and Colorado Republican clearly foreclose this argument as a matter of law." Id.
153. See Kruse, 142 F.3d at 916.
154. Id. at 913 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 96-97).
155. Id. at 915-16 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44).
156. Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44, 55).
157. Id. at 915.
158. Id. at 913 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55-59).
159. Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 471-72 (D. Vt. 2000). Recent data indicate
that during the period from 1997-2000 Vermont had one of the four lowest levels of
spending for its Gubernatorial elections. Id.; Gierzynski, supra note 4, at 193. It also had
one of the nation's lowest levels of spending in the 1999-2000 state legislative races. Id. at
200.
160. See Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 471-72.
161. Id. The only exception to these findings occurred in 1994, when the average
spending for single member districts was $10 over the $2000 ceiling established in Act 64.
Id. at 471. See also Landell v. Vt. Pub. Interest Research Group, No. 00-9159, dissent at 60
(2d Cir. Aug. 7, 2002) (Winter J., dissenting), available at
http://www.nvri.org/library/cases/vermont/Landell-v-SorrelUlLandellSecondCircuitDissent
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64's expenditure limits will have little to no impact on the amount of
campaign expenditures in Vermont. Therefore, these limits are
ineffective as a means of reducing Vermont's level of actual or apparent
corruption.
162
B. Vermont's Interest in Preventing Privileged Access
The preceding sections of this Comment show that the expenditure
limits contained in Act 64 fail to serve what, to date, has been identified
as the only compelling government interest sufficient to justify campaign
finance regulations.1 6 1 In light of this failure, the State of Vermont has
rejected the argument that Buckley v. Valeo foreclosed the possibility of
identifying a new compelling interest sufficient to justify limiting
expenditures. Instead, Vermont asserted the interest in preventing
privileged access of wealthy contributors to candidates at the expense of
those who cannot afford to make large contributions.M
Vermont's assertion of this interest suffers two fatal flaws, and as a
result, it fails to justify Act 64's expenditure limits. First, the interest in
preventing privileged access was implicitly rejected by the Supreme
Court in Buckley v. Valeo, and therefore is not a compelling state
interest.165 Buckley invalidated the interest in eliminating the corrupting
influence of money.166 By invalidating this broad interest, the Court
implicitly rejected several sub-interests, including the interest in
preventing privileged access.167
Both privileged access and the corrupting influence of money arise
from the same source. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court stated that the
corrupting influence of money arose from candidates' dependence on
large contributions.'6 The Court in Landell v. Vermont Public Interest
Research Group found that this same dependence caused candidates to. • 169
provide privileged access to wealthy contributors. Because both
.pdf, withdrawn 300 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2002). The average cost for a single-member
Vermont state Senate campaign is $4000; for a House campaign it is $2000. Id.
162. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 471, 481.
163. Id.; Landell, dissent at 7 (Winter, J., dissenting).
164. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 463; Landell, slip op. at 5.
165. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54, 55, 57 (1976). The court focused on the
statement in Buckley that "no governmental interest that has been suggested is sufficient
to justify" the expenditure limits. Landell, slip op. at 21.
166. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 54, 55, 57.
167. Id. at 55. The Buckley Court stated: "No governmental interest that has been
suggested is sufficient to justify the restriction on the quantity of political expression
imposed by § 608(c)'s campaign expenditure limitations." Id.
168. Id.
169. Landell, slip op. at 25-26. The court listed four factors that contributed to
privileged access. Id. Among them were the fact "that candidates were forced to spend
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privileged access and the corrupting influence of money arise from the
same source, the interests in eliminating them can be served by the same
means: contribution limits. 70  The presence of these strong similarities
indicates that preventing privileged access to candidates is not a separate
and distinct interest, but instead constitutes a specific sub-interest under
the broad interest in eliminating the corrupting influence of money.
The second flaw in Vermont's assertion of the interest in preventing
privileged access is that even if accepted as compelling, expenditure
limits are not a valid means of serving that interest. 7m Expenditure limits
fail as a means of preventing privileged access for many of the same• 172
reasons that they failed to prevent actual and apparent corruption.
First, there is no correlation between expenditures and privileged
access.173  Privileged access results when candidates provide access in
exchange for campaign contributions.1 74 Inherent in this statement is the
fact that privileged access results from contributions, not expenditures.
For example, the court cited allegations that Governor Dean vetoed a
pharmaceutical bill after receiving $6,000 in campaign contributions from
large drug companies.17- This privileged access was not the result of an
expenditure by Governor Dean, but rather was caused by the drug
companies' contributions to his campaign.
76
The lack of a correlation between expenditures and privileged access
demonstrates that expenditure limits do not directly serve the
government interest in preventing privileged access. 77 Yet, expenditure
limits can indirectly serve the interest in preventing privileged access by• .1 • 178
reducing the incentive of candidates to seek contributions. As a result,
candidates receive fewer contributions, and there are fewer instances of
privileged access. 79  However, this indirect connection is insufficient to
too much time fundraising" and that "fundraising requires candidates to give preferred
access to contributors over non-contributors ...." Id. at 25.
170. Landell, dissent at 69-70 (Winter, J., dissenting).
171. Landell, slip op. at 21-22.
172. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
173. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47; see also Landell, dissent at 8 (Winter, J., dissenting).
174. Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465 (D. Vt. 2000).
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. See discussion infra Part IV.A.I.
178. Interview with Robert Destro, Professor of Law, Catholic University of America,
Columbus School of Law (Nov. 26, 2002).
179. Id. Limiting the amount candidates are permitted to spend creates a point at
which it is no longer beneficial for them to seek further contributions because they would
be unable to spend such contributions. Id. Therefore, candidates receive fewer
contributions, producing the indirect result of reducing instances of privileged access. Id.
20031
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uphold Act 64's expenditure limits because it is more narrowly achieved
by the Act's contribution limits.'s8
V. SUCCEEDING WHERE VERMONT FAILED
Challenges to Buckley's treatment of expenditure limits must operate
within the framework of the standard of review established by the
Supreme Court.81  Therefore, states like Vermont must establish
campaign expenditure limits that are narrowly tailored to serve aS 182
compelling state interest. Within this framework, a state has two main
options: it can argue either that its expenditure limits serve the interest
in preventing corruption, or that a new compelling state interest will be
served.183 Whichever option the state selects, it will be required to make
a fact-based showing that expenditure limits are a valid means of serving
that interest. 84
States that assert the interest in preventing corruption are faced with
the seemingly insurmountable challenge of establishing a direct
connection between that interest and campaign expenditures. 185  It is
clear from Landell v. Sorrell that not enough has changed in the last
twenty-five years to make it easy to establish this connection 18The
evidence required to make such a showing must include strong empirical
data showing that, even when paired with contribution limits, unlimited
campaign expenditures threaten the integrity of the electoral process.8 7
An analysis of the records in Buckley and Kruse provides a useful
benchmark and illustrates that more than testimonial evidence and
reported incidents of corrupt campaign fundraising practices are
180. See 1997 Vermont State Election Campaign Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2801-
2883.
181. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
182. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
183. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
184. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
185. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
186. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
187. Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1998). In support of its
limitations on expenditures, the City presented a study conducted by the Center of
Responsive Politics. Id. The study showed that "the rise in the overall cost of city council
races has caused a corresponding rise in the influence of wealthy donors in the City's
elections, with such donors increasingly dominating the campaign financing process ...
and small donors . . .becoming marginal players in that process." Id. The City also
attached a copy of a public opinion survey that indicated that a large majority of the
citizens believed that wealthy contributors "wield undue influence on the political system
as a whole" and "that ordinary voters are unable to participate on equal footing in the
process." Id. The City also attached affidavits from former Cincinnati politicians
regarding the corrupting influence of money in politics. Id.
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necessary to establish the requisite connection."8 In both of these cases,
the Court found data illustrating the skyrocketing cost of campaigns and
growing public concern over the role of money in politics to be
insufficient to establish the connection between expenditure limits and
the interest in preventing corruption.89
A state asserting a new compelling interest must make a threshold
showing that its interest is separate and distinct from those interests
previously rejected by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.190 In
doing so, a state must address the three general interests explicitly
rejected as well as the corresponding sub-interests, which were implicitly
rejected.19' After making this showing, a state must then establish that
expenditure limits serve its asserted interest.'9 Buckley and Kruse
require a strong factual record to support this showing.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the most recent challenge to Buckley v. Valeo, Landell v. Sorrell
illustrates three basic principles that, despite the events of the last
twenty-five years, still have not changed. First, Buckley requires
government regulations of campaign finance to serve a compelling
government interest. Second, these regulations must be a valid means of
serving the interest asserted. And finally, the validity of such means is
established not through a showing of good intentions, but instead
through the assertion of a strong factual record.
188. See supra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
189. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
190. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See also discussion supra Part
II.C.3.
191. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
192. See supra Part II.C.2.
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